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s u m m a r y
Our paper describes the application of a realist approach to synthesizing evidence from 31 articles examining the environmental outcomes of marine protected areas governed under different types of property
regimes. The development of resource tenure interventions that promote sustainable management practices has been challenged by the difficulties of determining how contextual factors affect environmental
outcomes given the complexity of socio-ecological systems. Realist synthesis is a promising evidence
review technique for identifying the mechanisms that influence policy intervention outcomes in complex
systems. Through a combination of inductive and deductive analysis of the links between context, mechanisms, and outcomes, realist synthesis can help clarify when, how, where, and why property regime interventions are likely to result in positive environmental outcomes. Our study revealed the importance of
disaggregating property regimes into sub-categories, rather than treating them as homogenous categories. More importantly, use of a realist synthesis approach allowed us to gain a deeper understanding
of the ways in which three mechanisms—perceptions of legitimacy, perceptions of the likelihood of benefits, and perceptions of enforcement capacity—interact under different socio-ecological contexts to trigger behavioral changes that affect environmental conditions. The approach revealed the multi-faceted
and interactive nature of perceptions of legitimacy, in which legal legitimacy, social acceptability, and
ecological credibility combined to create robust legitimacy. The existence of robust legitimacy in turn
appeared to be an important contributor to the success of regulatory systems reliant on voluntary compliance. Our study contributes to the field of natural resources governance by demonstrating the utility of
a systematic review method which has received little attention by property scholars but which has promise to clarify understanding of how complex systems work. Our study also highlights that achieving
long-term sustainability requires paying greater attention to the mechanisms that support or undermine
people’s willingness to voluntarily engage in conservation behaviors.
Ó 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

1. Why property regimes matter
Practitioners, planners, and policy makers increasingly consider
the socio-ecological effects of property regimes in the design and
implementation of sustainable development and other
conservation-oriented policies and programs (Yin, 2016). Property
regimes—configurations of rights, duties, and legal authority structures over land or natural resources (Cousins, 1992)—are a key
aspect of natural resource governance systems, shaping how the
costs and benefits of those resources are distributed. The allocation
of costs and benefits, in turn, affects the incentives for individuals,
households, communities, and other social actors to engage in ecologically sustainable resource use and management (Lawry, 1990).

Four decades of empirical work have shown that positive environmental outcomes for common pool resources (i.e., resources
characterized by subtractibility and high exclusion costs) can be
achieved under any type of property regime (Yin, Zulu, Qi,
Freudenberger, & Sommerville, 2016). However, much property
regime research consists of single case studies or relatively
small-n comparative studies, making it challenging to evaluate
the patterns that distinguish effective regimes from ineffective
ones. Evidence reviews of empirical studies, such as metaanalyses, systematic reviews, and evidence syntheses are increasingly being used to address these shortcomings (Yin et al., 2016).
These reviews evaluate whether property regime interventions,
such as rights devolution or formalization, are effective at improving environmental conditions (Halpern, 2003; Yin et al., 2016).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.09.016
0305-750X/Ó 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Many evidence reviews on property regimes have examined the
institutional design attributes associated with common pool
resource systems managed sustainably under common property
regimes (Brooks, Waylen, & Borgerhoff-Mulder, 2013; Cox,
Arnold, & Villamayor Tomás, 2010). Identifying the socioecological contextual factors that influence whether property
regimes are successful at achieving positive ecological outcomes
has proved more challenging. When a particular set of contextual
and institutional design factors will result in positive environment
outcomes under a given property regime remains unclear (Brooks
et al., 2013; Porter-Bolland et al., 2012; Robinson, Holland, &
Naughton-Treves, 2014; Yin et al., 2016).
In the fields of public health and education, an evidence review
approach known as realist synthesis is increasingly being used to
identify the mechanisms that condition policy intervention outcomes when complex systems are involved. Realist syntheses seek
to ‘‘develop middle-range theories that explain how the context (C)
influences mechanisms (M) to generate outcomes (O), often called
context-mechanism-outcome (C-M-O) configurations” (Durham &
Bains, 2015, p. 3). Realist synthesis may prove equally useful for
clarifying when, how, where, and why property regime interventions, which typically occur in the context of complex socioecological systems, are likely to result in positive environmental
outcomes (Nilsson, Baxter, Butler, & McAlpine, 2016).
In this article, we adopt a realist synthesis approach to synthesizing evidence from a subset of articles included in a systematic
review that examined relationships between property regimes
and environmental outcomes for forestry, fisheries, and rangelands
(Ojanen et al., 2014, 2017). Due to limitations in time and resources
available, we limit our synthesis to the fisheries’ cases covered by
that review. We selected to focus on fisheries’ regimes because
they have received less attention than forest regimes. Our synthesis had two objectives. The first objective was to gain a better
understanding of the social mechanisms that influence the environmental outcomes of marine protected areas. An additional
objective of our synthesis was to determine whether marine protected areas (MPAs) governed under different types of property
regimes—state, community, and hybrid—differed in their environmental outcomes, and if so, whether it was possible to discern
what factors contributed to those differences in outcomes. For
the second objective, we did not assume a priori that any of the
regime types would be more effective than the others. Using a realist synthesis to evaluate these fisheries’ cases revealed the importance of disaggregating hybrid property regimes, which are
characterized by the sharing of property rights between more than
one institution, into sub-categories rather than treating them as
one category. It also allowed us to reach a better understanding
of three social mechanisms—perceptions of legitimacy, perceptions
of the likelihood of benefits, and perceptions of enforcement capacity—that condition conservation behaviors. Improved understanding of these mechanisms will facilitate progress toward achieving
the Sustainable Development Goals (United Nations, 2015), including SDG 1,1 No Poverty; SDG 12,2 Responsible Consumption and Production; and SDG 14,3 Life Below Water. Additionally, our study

1
Specifically sub-goal 1.4, ‘‘By 2030, ensure that all men and women, in particular
the poor and the vulnerable, have equal rights to economic resources, as well as
access to basic services, ownership and control over land and other forms of property,
inheritance, natural resources, appropriate new technology and financial services,
including microfinance.”
2
Especially sub-goal 12.2, ‘‘By 2030, achieve the sustainable management and
efficient use of natural resources.”
3
Sub-goal 14.B encourages parties to, ‘‘Provide access for small-scale artisanal
fishers to marine resources and markets.” Progress toward achieving the sub-goal
would be measured based on Indicator 14.B.1, ‘‘Progress by countries in the degree of
application of a legal/regulatory/policy/institutional framework which recognizes and
protects access.”

contributes to the resource governance field by demonstrating the
utility of an alternative approach to systematic reviews that has promise for yielding insight into the workings of complex socioecological systems.
(a) Rationale for a realist synthesis
A realist synthesis focuses attention on outcomes, the mechanisms that lead to them, and the contextual factors that trigger
particular outcomes (Durham & Bains, 2015; Pawson & Tilley,
1997). A key assumption of realist synthesis is that social change
is a function of individuals interacting with the social structure
in which they are situated. Policy interventions work by changing
the resources and opportunities available to people affected by the
interventions, leading to changes in their decisions (Wong,
Westhorp, Pawson, & Greenhalgh, 2013). Another assumption of
realist syntheses is that policy interventions do not produce outcomes in and of themselves. Rather, it is the mechanisms that
underlie interventions that result in outcomes (Durham & Bains,
2015). Astbury and Leeuw (2010) define mechanisms as the ‘‘underlying entities, processes, or structures which operate in particular contexts to generate outcomes of interest” (p. 368). Drawing
on Pawson and Tilley’s (1997) work, Dalkin, Greenhalgh, Jones,
Cunningham, and Lhuissier (2015) describe mechanisms as ‘‘a
combination of resources offered by the social programme under
study and stakeholders’ reasoning in response” (p. 3). In realist
synthesis parlance, policy interventions are not mechanisms.
Instead, interventions provide (or limit) resources or opportunities,
leading to particular sets of responses as a result of the affected
individual’s reasoning (Dalkin et al., 2015).
The context-mechanism-outcome (CMO) configurations identified during a realist synthesis make explicit the theories of change
that underlie the intervention being evaluated (Durham & Bains,
2015). Because mechanisms are functions of the interactions that
take place between participants and their context, interventions
implemented across different social contexts may result in different outcome patterns (Wong et al., 2013). A realist synthesis relies
on a combination of inductive and deductive analysis to study CMO
configurations (Rycroft-Malone et al., 2012). Each of the cases
included in the synthesis is examined to identify themes relevant
to the observed interactions between the theoretical framework
components (i.e., context-mechanisms-outcomes). Counterexamples are looked for as themes are identified, and the theoretical framework is modified accordingly.
(b) Our theory of change
Figure 1 depicts the theory of change that guided our realist
synthesis. Our theory of change is an adaptation of the SES framework (McGinnis & Ostrom, 2014), itself a variant of the IAD framework (Ostrom, 2011). As described by Ostrom (2007, p. 15182), the
SES framework enables one to examine how the attributes of a
resource system, the resource units it generates, the system’s
users, and its governance ‘‘jointly affect and are indirectly affected
by interactions and resulting outcomes at a particular time and
place”. Following Ostrom (2007), our theory of change posits that
property regimes are situated in socio-ecological systems, and
many contextual factors can affect their outcomes. In keeping with
the SES framework, we grouped the external factors that could
affect property regime outcomes into three major categories—socio
economic, political, and biophysical. However, we added time
elapsed since the property intervention occurred as a fourth external factor to account for the lag that may occur before impacts are
visible. Institutional design attributes of the property regime are
included in our theory of change as proximate contextual factors.
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Figure 1. Theory of change framework.

Drawing on property theory and empirical studies of CPR systems (e.g., Agrawal & Benson, 2011; Brooks et al., 2013; Cox
et al., 2010; Gutiérrez, Hilborn, & Defeo, 2011; Ostrom, 2007);
Robinson et al., 2014), we focused on investigating three mechanisms by which a property regime intervention may lead to
changes in environmental outcomes. Recall that mechanisms in a
realist synthesis are not institutional design structures, processes,
or policies, but rather consist of the combination of changes in
resource availability brought about by a program or policy intervention and stakeholders’ reasoning in response to those changes
(Dalkin et al., 2015). Drawing on Cox et al.’s (2010) elaboration of
Ostrom’s original eight design principles we posited three likely
mechanisms. One mechanism, perceptions of the regime’s legitimacy, is related to institutional design principles 1A (welldefined boundaries), 1B (well-defined resource users), 2A (congruence between rules and local conditions), and 3 (resource user participation in rule making). By perceptions of legitimacy, we mean
recognition on the part of resource users that the individual or collectivity holding the resource has (or does not have) the authority
to make decisions about how the resource is managed. Such
authority could be grounded in a country’s formal legal system,
but it could also be grounded in social norms and customs
(Turner et al., 2016). DeWit and Iles (2016) define legitimacy as
existing when ‘‘people accept something—knowledge, norms, customs, or technologies—as credible and authoritative, and express
or practice it widely.” A second mechanism, perceptions on the
part of resource users as to whether the resource holder is able
or likely to enforce management decisions, is related to institutional design principles 4A/B (monitoring) and 5 (graduated sanctions). The third mechanism, the resource user’s perceptions as to
whether she will benefit from the intervention, either now or in
the future, is related to institutional design 2B (benefits proportional to investment in terms of labor, money, or materials).
According to our theory of change, a property regime intervention,
such as setting aside areas for protection, will trigger one or more
of these three mechanisms, resulting first in intermediate outcomes as reflected in behavioral changes on the part of individuals
or groups, and subsequently leading to changes in environmental

conditions. The C-M-O analysis that characterizes the realist synthesis approach complements the SES framework and the design
principles described by Ostrom (2011) and elaborated upon by
Cox et al. (2010) in that the mechanisms identified through this
approach seek to explain what it is that makes the design principles work.

2. Methods
The cases examined were selected from a dataset of 103 articles
that scientists at the Center for International Forestry Research had
previously identified through a systematic review process (Ojanen
et al., 2014, 2017). That dataset included studies that provided
quantitative measures or qualitative assessments of the changes
or differences in environmental conditions between the property
regimes being compared; the cases also specified which social
actors held one or more of the rights associated with the property
regimes under study. To keep the scope of the realist synthesis
manageable, we included only the fisheries’ articles from the original dataset. We excluded nine of the 40 fisheries’ articles (Supplemental file 1), leaving 31 articles encompassing 49 cases
(Supplemental files 2 and 3). Figure 2 depicts our article identification and selection process.
The 31 publications included 28 peer review journal articles
and three technical reports (Supplemental file 3), most of which
were published during 2005–2013 (Figure 3). Studies in Latin
America or the Caribbean were most common (15), followed by
Asia/Pacific Islands (12), and Africa (6). The majority of articles
dealt with coral reef fish populations (21 articles); other types of
fisheries included invertebrates, such as abalone, cockles, and rock
lobster (7 articles), fish and invertebrates (1 article), river turtles (1
article), and a lake fishery (1 article).
We define a property regime as the set of rights and duties that
specify how individuals or groups relate to each other with respect
to land or a natural resource (Bromley & Cernea, 1989). Property
rights scholars often group property regimes into three major categories—private, state, and common property—based on how the
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Primary research databases, general web search engines, publication websites of
research institutes, research networks, and international organizations

34,984
articles

Title and abstract screening

34,411
articles
excluded

1441
articles

319 articles not found

Full text screening

609 articles excluded

188
articles

Additional criteria for data extraction and
critical appraisal

85 articles excluded

51 forestry
articles

13 rangeland
articles

45 fisheries
articles

Realist synthesis inclusion criteria
9 articles excluded

31 fisheries
articles (49 cases)

21 articles (34 cases) –
Phase 1 CMO analysis only

10 articles (15 cases) –
Phase 1 & 2 CMO analysis

Figure 2. Article identification and selection; realist synthesis steps in gray highlights.
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Figure 3. Temporal distribution of articles included in the realist synthesis.

property rights and responsibilities are distributed among social
actors (Bromley & Cernea, 1989; Schlager & Ostrom, 1992). Moreover, many common pool resource systems are characterized by

the presence of ‘‘linkages and blurred boundaries between discrete
property types, rights holders and property regimes” (German,
2010, p. 572). The concept of property as consisting of a bundle
of rights (Schlager & Ostrom, 1992) emphasizes the hybrid nature
of property regimes, with ownership best understood in the context of a variety of rights being associated with any given piece
of land or resource. The rights in the bundle can be either de jure
rights that have been explicitly granted to the resource user by a
government or de facto rights which resource users have defined
and enforced, but which are not recognized by state authorities
(Schlager & Ostrom, 1992).
We initially grouped the property regimes in each case into one
of three broad categories—state, hybrid, and customary tenure. (No
private property regimes were present in the 49 fisheries’ cases).
However, it quickly became apparent that the hybrid regimes differed considerably in how they distributed rights and responsibilities among social actors. To better capture these distinctions, we
divided the hybrid regimes into three sub-categories:
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Table 1
Definitions of property regimes included in our dataset and their geographic distribution
Regime type/definition

Geographic distribution

A. Customary (n = 16)
Regimes in which access to fishery resources is controlled by social units, which are operative over a bounded
geographical space, and where local people and their traditional authorities control access and enforce the
rules

Fiji (4)
Indonesia (2)
Papua New Guinea (2)
Solomon Islands (6)
St. Lucia (informal) (1)
Mexico (informal) (1)

B. Hybrid (n = 19)
Regimes in which interdependencies exist either between entities with jurisdiction over defined property regimes or where self-organized and formal governance
institutions exist in complementarity
Ecuador (1)
B1—Community-managed state concessions (n = 3)
Mexico (1)
State regimes within which the state has granted a resource user long-term exclusive use rights to resources
Nicaragua (1)
located within a defined geographical area. The concessionaire undertakes to manage the resource sustainably
in exchange for exclusive use rights for a designated time period
Brazil (3)
B2—Community-based co-management (n = 8)
Philippines (4)
Regimes in which planning, management, and decision-making is shared among government, local users, and
Tanzania (1)
other stakeholders associated with the marine protected area. The degree to which the government retains
control varies greatly among co-management regimes. Goetze and Pomeroy (2005) situate co-management
regimes along a continuum of shared control, ranging from consultative co-management in which the
government seeks input from communities but makes the decisions, to collaborative co-management in which
the government and resource users share decision-making authority, to delegated co-management in which
the government cedes decision-making authority through a formal agreement to a community or user group
Belize (3)
B3—NGO-based co-management (n = 8)
Indonesia (2)
Cases in which state agencies had established formal agreements with NGOs to manage marine protected
Panama (1)
areas were defined as NGO-CM regimes. The NGO to which the government delegates its authority can be a
Tanzania (2)
local NGO or an international NGO, such as The Nature Conservancy or World Wide Fund for Nature, and the
degree to which local resource users are involved in managing such fisheries varies greatly (Espinosa-Romero,
Rodriguez, Weaver, Villanueva-Aznar, & Torre, 2014)
C. State (n = 14)
Belize (1)
Regimes in which the government holds and manages fishery resources on behalf of its citizens
Brazil (1)
Colombia (1)
Grenada (1)
Indonesia (1)
Mexico (1)
Philippines (1)
South Africa (6)
St. Lucia (1)
Source: Realist synthesis analysis (2016).

community-managed state concessions, community-based comanagement (CBCM), and NGO-based co-management (NGOCM). Definitions of the regime categories are provided in Table 1.
3. Data extraction
We adopted a two-phase CMO analysis process to explore how
well our theory of change framework was represented in the 49
cases. For each case, the lead author extracted data (a form of coding) pertaining to each of our theory of change elements to create a
preliminary CMO chart (see Supplemental file 4a for an example
chart and Supplemental file 4b for a list of variables used to assess
the elements). After a preliminary chart was created for each case,
the lead author then carefully reviewed all of the cases as a group
to ensure that the coding was consistent for each element of the
theory of change across the cases. Because the same researcher
did all of the coding, we did not use an inter-coder reliability process. Once the first round of data extraction was done, we assessed
the charts for their coverage of each of our theory of change elements. We grouped each case into one of three categories: (1) minimal to no data for most elements, (2) a cursory description for
most elements, and (3) a robust description for most elements.
4. Results of the Phase 1 CMO analysis
The Phase 1 CMO analysis revealed that the coverage of the
framework elements was generally weak. Fishing effort was the
most commonly reported type of socio-economic data, but despite

its clear relevance to conservation was provided in less than 50% of
the cases (Figure 4a). Socio-demographic data were present in only
22% of the cases. Less than one-third of the cases provided robust
data on regime attributes, governance factors, intermediate outcomes, and mechanisms. About one-fifth of the cases provided data
about compliance (Figure 4b); and 12% included data on motivations for compliance and/or changes in fishing or livelihood practices in response to protection strategies. Of the 49 cases in our
initial selection, only 15 had robust data on all or most key elements of our theory of change framework.
Table 1 shows the distribution of the Phase 1 cases across
regime categories and regions. Roughly one-third (16) of the cases
assessed the environmental outcomes of protected areas or periodic closures of fisheries governed under customary regimes. Nineteen cases involved some form of hybrid property regime and 14
involved protected areas held or managed by nation-states. Customary regimes were most likely to result in better environmental
outcomes than control sites (69% of cases) (Figure 5a and b), followed by hybrid regimes (58%) and state regimes (43%). Figure 5b
suggests that the hybrid regime sub-categories may differ in terms
of their environmental outcomes, with community-managed state
concessions accounting for much of the difference between the
performance of hybrid and state regime categories. Although the
sample sizes are too small to draw definitive conclusions as to differences among the hybrid regimes, these results suggest that disaggregation of hybrid regimes into sub-categories would be an
important step for larger N studies. The lack of key data in the
majority of the studies also points to the need for future research
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Quality of data for theory of change framework elements
(numbers in bars indicate number of cases)
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6
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10
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39

50%

100%

Figure 4. (a and b) Extent of coverage within articles for key factors.

to be more conscientious about reporting socio-demographic and
contextual data as well as providing better coverage of regime
attributes, governance factors, mechanisms, and outcomes.
(a) Results of the Phase II CMO analyses
For Phase II, we selected the 15 cases identified as having robust
data (i.e., data on all or most of the elements in our theory of
change framework as they were the only cases with sufficient
detail to allow for in-depth analysis (see Supplemental file 5 for
a summary chart of the cases). Through case narratives for each
regime type, we examine whether the three mechanisms (perceptions of legitimacy, perceptions of the likelihood of benefits, and
perceptions of enforcement capacity) were present, the contexts
associated with these mechanisms, and how the CMO patterns
aligned with environmental outcomes.
(i) Customary regimes
Three of the cases (Ahus Island, Muluk, and Kakarotan) examined during the in-depth CMO analysis involved customary fisheries’ regimes with deeply embedded practices. The other two
cases (Roviana Lagoon and Puerto Peñasco) dealt with customary
regimes in which new fisheries’ protection strategies were introduced through collaborations between local fishers and outside
scientists. The ecological outcomes of the Ahus Island, Muluk,
Kakarotan, and Roviana Lagoon regimes were better than control

sites; they were worse for the informal customary tenure regime
in Puerto Peñasco.
Culturally embedded practices (Ahus Island, Muluk, Kakarotan):
The Ahus Island (Cinner, Marnane, & McClanahan, 2005), Muluk
(Cinner, Marnane, McClanahan, & Almany, 2006), and Kakarotan
(Cinner et al., 2006) protection strategy consisted of closing designated areas of coral reefs and then opening them to fishing for brief
periods at times when large quantities of fish were needed for ceremonial occasions. The primary purpose of the closures was to
ensure a supply of fish for ceremonial occasions, with conservation
being byproduct rather than the main goal (Cinner, 2005). Perceptions of legitimacy for these practices, which were deeply rooted in
the cultures, were widespread among local fishers and the broader
community. The closures’ legal legitimacy stemmed from customary law, but also from the communities’ respective nation-states
(Papua New Guinea and Indonesia), which formally recognized
the authority of these traditional marine tenure regimes. The
authors described the customary systems as being strong enough
that outsiders respected the authority of customary leaders. In all
three cases, the periodic closure systems had strong ecological
credibility and social legitimacy within the community. Customary
leaders relied on their ecological knowledge and input from experienced fishers to determine what areas should be closed and when
they were ready to be opened temporarily. Perceptions of social
legitimacy were established through the periodic openings and
associated celebrations where the ecological benefits were made
visible (i.e., fish were harvested), the community received tangible
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Environmental outcomes of property regimes (n=49)
(number of cases indicated inside bars)

a)
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Environmental outcomes of property regime interventions (n=49)
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Figure 5. (a and b) Environmental outcomes of property regimes.

benefits (i.e., fish were distributed to all participants), and the rules
governing the closures were reiterated publicly in ceremonies
associated with the feast.
Because everyone benefitted from the closures, community
members had an incentive to comply with the rules and to make
sure that others complied as well. High levels of voluntary compliance meant that organized patrols were unnecessary, and the economic and social costs of enforcement were low. The closed areas
were situated in areas where poachers could easily be seen, providing further incentive for voluntary compliance by reinforcing the
likelihood that fishers would perceive that infractions were likely
to be noticed. The positive feedback between the intersecting
mechanisms of perceptions of legitimacy, benefits, and enforcement capacity likely contributed to the positive outcomes
observed in the closure sites relative to nearby control sites open
to fishing. In these three cases, both a viable protection strategy
and the governance structure for implementation were already
firmly in place, and realizing positive environmental outcomes
was largely dependent on the capacity of the communities to continue reinforcing the legitimacy of the closures and the customary
legal framework in which they were embedded. Contextual factors
likely contributing to the success of these systems included the
communities’ relative physical isolation, small and homogeneous
populations, strong traditional leaders, state recognition of the customary system, and the crucial role that periodic feasts played in
the maintenance of social and trading relations within the community and with neighboring communities.

New practices in existing customary regimes: The Roviana Lagoon
(Aswani & Weiant, 2004) and Puerto Peñasco (Cudney-Bueno &
Basurto, 2009) cases shed light on the role that perceptions of legitimacy, likelihood of benefits, and enforcement capacity play in
facilitating or undermining efforts to embed new practices in
resource systems governed under customary regimes. In Roviana
Lagoon, two customary regimes had been in place for many generations and their authorities were recognized under the Solomon
Islands’ national law. A history of inter-clan and intra-clan rivalry
existed within and between lagoon communities. Although both
customary tenure systems had periodic fishing grounds closures,
the proposed practices of temporary closures for shellfish and permanent no-take areas were new. Because the practices were new,
many women, who were the primary shellfish collectors, were
skeptical that reductions in access to key harvesting grounds
would be sufficiently offset by improvements linked to the
closures.
Supportive leadership on the part of local authorities proved to
be crucial to the success of the project. The initial resistance to seasonal closures was only overcome after widely respected church
authorities intervened. Once villagers participating in monitoring
events observed positive results in a test site closed for one year,
the participating communities agreed to designate permanent
no-take areas. However, illegal harvesting remained a problem,
suggesting that a significant portion of collectors may have perceived a weakness in local capacity to enforce the closures. Contextual factors that likely played a role in the positive outcome of the
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closures, despite the initial skepticism and strong inter-clan and
intra-clan tensions, included the lagoon’s relatively remote location, reliance on a participatory design and implementation process for establishing the no-take zones, and the support from a
widely respected spiritual authority.
In Puerto Peñasco (Mexico), a fishing cooperative established
several permanent no-take zones for benthic invertebrates. However, the fishing cooperative lacked state-recognized authority to
make and enforce fishing regulations that applied to persons
who did not belong to the cooperative. Support within the cooperative for the no-take reserves was high, with the closures’ legitimacy being rooted in a design process in which fishers’
knowledge informed the siting and size of the protected areas.
Additionally, most cooperative members believed that the notake areas would result in an improved fishery. The cooperative
relied on voluntary compliance and informal sanctions within the
group to enforce the rules. Initially the cooperative received support from local officials to keep outside fishers from fishing in
the reserves. However, when the supportive local fisheries’ official
was replaced, his replacement refused to enforce the reserve
boundaries. This left the cooperative with no legal means to stop
outsiders from fishing in the reserves. Once cooperative members
saw that outside fishers fished in the reserves with impunity, they
too began to disregard the restrictions. Within a few months of losing state backing for enforcement, the populations of benthic
invertebrates in the former no-take zones had dropped precipitously. Contextual factors that likely contributed to the initially
positive ecological outcomes for the Puerto Peñasco reserves
included the presence of a well-organized cooperative with strong
internal social capital, personal relations between cooperative
members and local enforcement officials, and a generalized agreement among the cooperative members that they needed to take
action to protect their fishery. Additionally two of the reserves
were situated such that poachers were easily identified, and informal surveillance was used to monitor compliance in the third
reserve. However, the cooperative’s lack of legal legitimacy in the
eyes of local state officials and outside fishers left the reserves vulnerable to outside encroachment when informal arrangements
with local officials collapsed. The case illustrates the pivotal role
that a single individual can play in determining outcomes, and
points to the importance of identifying such weak points and seeking ways to build in redundancies so as to reduce the likelihood of
system collapses tied to the actions or decisions of a single
individual.
(ii) State regimes
The two state regimes included in the dataset were the first
marine protected areas established in their countries. The Sumilon
Island sanctuary (Walmsley & White, 2003) was established in
1974 in the Philippines and the National Natural Park Rosario
and San Bernardo Corals (hereafter referred to as RSB Corals)
(Camargo et al., 2009) in Colombia was created in 1977. Ecological
conditions at monitored sites within the RSB Corals park differed
little from adjacent de facto open access control sites; they were
poorer within the Sumilon Island sanctuary than in adjacent de
facto open access control sites. Both regimes are best described
as relatively mature but dysfunctional.
The Sumilon Island national fish sanctuary is located off a small,
uninhabited island in the central Philippines. Those who fished in
the area came from several communities located on a nearby
island. Initially the municipality in which Sumilon Island sanctuary
is located managed the reserve, and the sanctuary had the support
of the local mayor. However, the sanctuary’s legitimacy was undermined when a new mayor opposed to the sanctuary took office.
Fishers’ skepticism about whether they would benefit from the
sanctuary may have played a role in fostering chronic illegal fishing

(Walmsley & White, 2003). When it became clear that the new
mayor would not enforce the sanctuary’s boundaries or gear
restrictions, the national government took over the sanctuary’s
management. However, illegal fishing and destructive fishing practices continued, suggesting that fishers disagreed with the restrictions and perceived that the state lacked the capacity to enforce
the restrictions. Contextual factors likely contributing to the sanctuary’s poor performance relative to control sites included typhoon
damage to the sanctuary’s coral reef in the 1980s, absence of a
nearby settlement, sustained local political opposition to the sanctuary, and failure to involve fishers in the initial planning
(Walmsley & White, 2003).
The RSB Corals’ case involved a multi-zone MPA located off the
coast of Colombia in which certain fishing practices (e.g., use of
gunpowder) and gear restrictions (e.g., prohibition on smallmesh nets) were in force, and industrial fishing was prohibited.
Perceptions that the reserve lacked social legitimacy among local
fishers were evidenced during simulation games in which the fishers’ behavior suggested that many disagreed with the restrictions
on fishing methods and fishing area closures. Additionally, the
games revealed that fishers felt that the park rangers treated
industrial fishers more leniently than local fishers and did not
enforce the prohibition on industrial fishing. Eighty-six percent
of the park staff stated that the rules were hard to enforce
(Camargo et al., 2009), indicating that many fishers perceived the
state’s enforcement capacity to be low. Fishers justified their failure to adhere to the park rules on the grounds that their extreme
poverty together with the lack of other livelihood options forced
them to engage in illicit fishing activities. This suggests that the
fishers felt that any benefits from following the rules were outweighed by the cost in terms of their ability to support their families. Contextual factors that likely contributed to the park having
ecological outcomes similar to control sites included the park managers’ failure to involve local communities in developing park
objectives and regulations, lack of communication between the
park staff and local community members regarding the park’s
on-going management, and a very high percentage of households
living in poverty with few livelihood options.
(iii) Community-based co-management regimes
The CBCM cases involved the simultaneous introduction of new
fisheries’ protection practices with new fisheries’ governance systems. The cases included three small MPAs in the Philippines
(Apo, Balicasag, and Pamilacan Islands) (Walmsley & White,
2003), no-take zones in a large marine extractive reserve in Brazil
(Itacolomis Reef) (Francini-Filho & Moura, 2008), and several small
no-take zones in Tanzania (Fumba) (Crawford et al., 2010). The
MPAs in the Philippines were established in the 1980s. Their governance regimes were widely supported, and functioned well. The
no-take zones in Fumba and Itacolomis Reef dated from the early
2000s. Their governance regimes were struggling to establish legitimacy among fishers and develop their enforcement capacity. A
feature common to all five cases is that the communities had legally recognized exclusive use rights to the protected areas. The
Apo, Balicasag, and Pamilacan Island MPAs and Itacolomis Reef’s
no-take zones showed positive environmental outcomes relative
to control sites; the Fumba no-take zones had environmental outcomes similar to adjacent control sites.
The fishery protection strategy for Apo, Balicasag, and Pamilacan Islands consisted of establishing small permanent no-take
zones. The Apo and Pamilacan sanctuaries were managed under
local municipal ordinances. The Balicasag sanctuary was initially
managed by the local municipality under a similar ordinance, but
later was jointly managed by the local municipality and the
national tourism agency. Local support for all three sanctuaries
was high (100% in all three communities) (Walmsley & White,
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2003), an indicator that they were widely perceived as legitimate.
Moreover, 100% of the interviewees from Apo and Pamilacan and
90% of those from Balicasag perceived that the entire community
had a say in managing the sanctuary. These figures are indicative
of a widely held sense of ownership, reinforcing perceptions of
the sanctuaries’ legitimacy. Moreover, most local fishers believed
that the reserves would yield benefits. Fishers stated that their
catch had remained stable or increased during recent years and
that they were spending less time fishing to catch the same
amounts. Key informants stated that they had been successful in
excluding outsiders and locals from fishing in the sanctuaries, an
indicator that most fishers perceived that the communities had
the capacity to enforce the boundaries of the no-take reserves.
Walmsley and White (2003) attribute the low levels of poaching
to broad community support for the reserves, resulting in widespread willingness to comply voluntarily with the restrictions.
Contextual factors likely contributing to the success of the Apo,
Pamilacan, and Balicasag sanctuaries included their small size,
which made them socially acceptable to local fishers, and their
proximity to villages, which facilitated enforcement, the presence
of a small and culturally homogenous resource user group, and
state legal backing that enabled community members to exclude
outsiders.
For Itacolomis Reef (Brazil), the fishery protection strategy consisted of the establishment of a large no-take zone in the Marine
Extractive Reserve of Corumbau (MERC) (Francini-Filho & Moura,
2008). The Brazilian government formally recognized MERC and
only local fishers were allowed to fish within its boundaries. Fishers had a fifty percent plus one representation on the MERC management council. The reserve covered 930 km2, and included
multiple no-take zones, with the 10-km2 no-take zone on the Itacolomis Reef being the largest. The no-take zones have been the
focus of much controversy among local fishers, many of whom
have resisted attempts to restrict their access to traditional fishing
grounds. Some fishers opposed the siting of no-take zones in the
inner coral reefs because they were unable to reach the outer reefs
with their non-motorized boats. The strong opposition to the notake zones was a sign that the no-take zones lacked social legitimacy despite the council’s legal authority to designate them. The
evidence suggests that the lack of social legitimacy was linked to
local fishers’ perceptions that the benefits of the no-take zones
would not make up for the loss of access. This conclusion is supported by the fishers’ initial proposal to limit the no-take area to
one km2 (a tenth of its final area) to keep reductions in access to
traditional fishing grounds to a minimum. Violations of the notake zone occurred frequently, suggesting that fishers perceived
that enforcement capacity for the reserve was weak and that fishers felt little peer pressure to comply voluntarily with the restrictions. The absence of peer pressure and the associated cultural
norms that would have encouraged voluntary compliance is
another indicator that the no-take zone lacked social legitimacy.
Resistance to the no-take zones remained strong, even though
long-term monitoring results, which showed that the biomass of
several commercially important species was consistently higher
in the no-take zones, were shared with local fishers each year.
Francini-Filho and Moura (2008) attribute the lack of compliance
by fishers to their weak position in commercial markets combined
with increased demand for large-bodied fish, such as parrotfishes.
In short, the costs of compliance outweighed the risks associated
with non-compliance. It is puzzling that the no-take zone had better environmental outcomes than nearby control sites. Based on
the limited data provided, one can surmise that the fact that local
fishers have a sizeable representation on the management council
may translate into sufficiently high buy-in among local fishers of
the need to decrease fishing effort in the reserve that the fish population is able to do marginally better inside the reserve than out-
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side of it. Indeed, Francini-Filho and Moura found that fishing
pressure did decrease significantly during the first year of the notake zone; but over time it has gradually increased. It remains to
be seen whether the gains made early on will be sufficient to offset
the observed increase in illegal harvesting over the long run. Contextual factors that may have contributed to the improved ecological outcomes observed in the protected area compared with
adjacent open fishing grounds were not identified by the authors
of the Itacolomis reef study.
The Fumba Peninsula (Tanzania) case involved an outsidefunded initiative to establish several small (2–6 ha) no-take zones
for cockles along Zanzibar’s coast (Crawford et al., 2010). To secure
their rights to the cockles, the communities established a set of bylaws, developed ordinances laying out the rules and penalties for
non-compliance, and created a committee to manage the no-take
reserves. These actions gave them exclusive rights to the resources
under Zanzibar’s Resources Management and Conservation Act.
However, the communities’ selection of poor-quality sites for some
of the reserves suggests that some doubt exists as to whether the
benefits from the reserves will outweigh loss of access. Poaching
by villagers and outside harvesters has plagued the sites, indicating
the presence of a widespread perception that local villagers lack
the capacity to enforce the no-take reserves. The high level of
poaching at the beginning of Ramadan, when the need for extra
cash is particularly great, may reflect beliefs among community
members that the reserves lack social legitimacy. Contextual factors that likely contributed to the lack of difference in ecological
outcomes between the no-take zones and control sites in Fumba
included siting of no-take zones in poor-quality habitat and the
small size of the no-take zones, community members’ periodic
need for cash along with cockle harvesting being one of the few
options for earning income, and the high demand for cockles in
an area close to a major market.
(iv) NGO-based co-management
Our sample included one NGO-CM regime, Karimunjawa
National Park (Indonesia) (Campbell et al., 2012). Karimunjawa’s
protection strategy consisted of revising the park’s zoning to incorporate fishers’ input into the siting of use zones and the rules governing them. The park’s original zoning plan was created with little
local input and the park’s spatial restrictions had been widely
ignored. In 2005, self-organized village planning groups participated in an NGO-supported community consultation process to
develop new use zones. These included two types of no-take zones
and several types of use zones. Four years of ecological monitoring
found that coral cover had increased in all zones in the park, but
had decreased in the open access control sites. However, while fish
biomass was greater in all park zones than in the control sites, fish
biomass within the park had declined over time.
Campbell et al.’s (2012) study indicates that local fishers were
ambivalent about the legitimacy and ecological credibility of the
no-take zones. Awareness among local fishers of the new gear
and spatial restrictions was high, but whereas most fishers complied with the gear restrictions, compliance with the spatial
restrictions was poor. Discussions with local fishers and community members revealed that fishers perceived that the gear restrictions had a positive impact on the fishery. However, they were less
certain as to whether the spatial restrictions would improve the
fishery enough to make up for the loss of valued fishing grounds.
Campbell et al. reported that local fishers, many of whom
depended on fishing for their livelihoods, saw little benefit to
respecting the no-take zones given that community members
would not be able to harvest fish in them. Concern about the loss
of benefits from no-take zones was further evidenced by local fishers’ refusal to have no-take reserves located near settlements
where they could be easily patrolled. They argued that close-in
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no-take zones would negatively affect community members who
were dependent on gleaning shellfish or fishing in areas close to
land. In short, gear restrictions were considered socially acceptable, ecologically credible, and economically beneficial, whereas
spatial restrictions were not.
Fishers’ selective adherence to the park’s restrictions also
appears to have been linked to their perceptions of the state’s differential capacity to enforce restrictions. Campbell et al. found that
the state commonly enforced gear violations but rarely patrolled or
enforced the no-take zones. Moreover, the penalties for gear violations were much higher than those for fishing in the no-take zones
with legal gear. The no-take zones were all situated some distance
from settlements, increasing the likelihood that fishers could fish
in them with impunity. Contextual factors likely contributing to
better ecological outcomes in the park management zones despite
the state’s limited enforcement capacity included widespread
involvement of fishers in developing the new zoning plan for the
park and subsequent high levels of awareness about park restrictions, as well as widespread willingness to comply with gear
restrictions.
(v) Community-managed state concessions
Isla Costa Rica (ICR) in Ecuador (Beitl, 2011) and Aserradores
Estuary in Nicaragua (Crawford et al., 2010) involved community
managed state concessions. In both cases, the communities established protected areas for cockle habitat, and the ecological outcomes for the protected areas were better than for control sites.
In the ICR’s state concession, several formally organized community associations implemented short-term rotating closures
along with minimum shell size restrictions to improve cockle productivity off the coast of Ecuador. The concession, known as a custodia, provided the associations with 10-year renewable use rights
to an area over which members had ancestral resource rights
claims. In return for use rights, the concessionaires had to develop
a state-approved management plan and by-laws. All the ICR community members interviewed during Beitl’s (2011) study supported the custodia, indicating that the cockle protection
measures were widely perceived internally as socially legitimate.
Support for the protective measures was strongly reinforced once
the association members saw that the rotational closures and size
restrictions resulted in more and bigger cockles.
Support for the cockle bed closures was less widespread within
neighboring communities. Objections to the closures were
grounded in a long-standing tradition among the area’s inhabitants
that everyone had a right to gather cockles in the mangrove forest.
ICR’s assertion of exclusive use rights to its custodia thus existed in
strong tension with a deeply rooted belief among area inhabitants
that depriving someone of cockle beds in the mangrove forests was
morally wrong. To defend the cockle enclosures, the ICR associations developed a rotating system of guards to prevent poaching
by insiders and outsiders. To facilitate surveillance, the cockle beds
designated for rotational closures were located in an area easily
accessible by community members. The closed areas were physically situated so that a watcher in a central location could see if
poachers were present. Within-group adherence to the rules was
strong. And as it became clear that ICR had legal backing from
the state to exclude outsiders, trespassing by outsiders virtually
ceased. The near absence of poaching in the rotational closure
areas at the 10-year mark was indicative that insiders and outsiders alike perceived ICR’s enforcement capacity to be strong. Contextual factors that contributed to the ecological success of ICR’s
cockle bed closure included the relatively remote location, the
community’s small and culturally homogenous population, and
the heavy dependence of most households on mangrove resources,
including cockles, for subsistence and cash income. Also important
was the strong internal social capital within the custodia associa-

tions, as well as the bridging social capital created through the
associations’ involvement in a regional fishing alliance and the
technical and legal assistance provided by an outside NGO.
The Aserradores Estuary case involved a project in which scientists and extension agents affiliated with an outside-funded conservation and sustainable livelihoods initiative worked with
women cockle harvesters to establish a network of small-scale permanently closed cockle reserves. Initiative leaders persuaded the
Nicaraguan Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources
(MARENA) to issue an experimental permit providing the participants temporary exclusive use rights to cockle grounds in the
study area. The permit gave the cockle reserve network legitimacy
in the legal sense, but social acceptability and ecological credibility
took longer to develop. Community members were initially skeptical that the no-take reserves would improve cockle productivity
enough to make up for reduced access. As a result, they hesitated
to set aside no-take areas and once they agreed to do so, they were
reluctant to select areas with good-quality habitat. However, once
group members saw that the increased productivity offset the loss
of access, participants began to see the no-take reserves as both
ecologically and socially legitimate. The shift in the community’s
perceptions was reflected in their decision to establish two additional no-take reserves in better quality habitat. The initiative’s
participatory ecological monitoring program, which enabled the
women to see for themselves the increase in cockle densities,
was an important factor in convincing participants of the ecologically viability of the reserves.
In the initiative’s second year, the legal legitimacy of the
reserves was nearly undermined when the national government
made a top-down decision to ban the sale of cockles in the Aserradores Estuary. With assistance from university researchers, the
community group negotiated an agreement with state officials in
which the local mayor was given authority to control cockle harvests in the Aserradores Estuary and issue commercial permits to
the cockle harvester group. Although the rights granted were tenuous, the agreement nonetheless reflected ‘‘a degree of formal delegation of responsibility from the central government to the local
municipality and the cockle harvesters to manage the harvest
and sale of cockles from the estuary” (Crawford et al., 2010, p.
203). The agreement also formalized the group’s exclusive right
to sell cockles, which amounted to the granting of an exclusive
use right for much of the cockle harvest. By the end of the initiative’s third year, support for the no-take reserves within the Aserradores communities was strong. High levels of compliance
indicated that locals perceived that the cockle harvesting group’s
capacity to enforce the rules was strong. However, the increased
productivity of the no-take reserves attracted the attention of
neighboring villagers, and poaching by outsiders was on the rise,
suggesting that outsiders were not convinced that the Aserradoresans had a legitimate claim to exclusive rights to the reserves, and
also that the enforcement system, which relied on voluntary compliance, was ineffective against encroachers. Contextual factors
that likely contributed to the no-take reserves’ positive outcomes
included the community’s remote location, a large percentage of
households reliant on cockle harvesting for subsistence and cash
income, and the threat of national legislation prohibiting the sale
of cockles, a law which directly threatened Aserradoresans’
livelihoods.

5. Discussion
A realist synthesis of the 31 fisheries’ articles included in our
dataset makes visible the wide range of contexts in which fisheries’
protection strategies are being implemented in Africa, Asia, and
Latin America. As well, the 15 in-depth case narratives highlight
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the important role that perceptions of legitimacy, enforcement
capacity, and likelihood of benefits can play in both strengthening
and weakening protection efforts. The next section sums up the
key findings of our synthesis, focusing first on the importance of
disaggregating the hybrid regime category and then on exploring
how the three mechanisms present in our theory of change framework supported or undermined fisheries’ protection in these cases.
(a) Disaggregating the hybrid regime category
A comparison of the environmental outcomes of the customary,
hybrid, and state regimes relative to control sites showed that
hybrid regimes were more likely to have positive outcomes than
state regimes but less likely to have positive outcomes than customary regimes. However, disaggregating the hybrid regime category into sub-categories revealed that the community-managed
state concessions had better environmental outcomes relative to
co-management regimes. Among the co-management regimes,
CBCM regimes had slightly better outcomes than NGO-CM
regimes. However, the sample sizes are too small to draw definitive conclusions. Expanding the number of cases and geographic
coverage for each regime type in future studies would help determine whether the patterns identified here hold up more broadly
and what factors might explain differences.
(b) Deconstructing the mechanisms
Perceptions of legitimacy, likelihood of receiving benefits, and
enforcement capacity emerged as important mechanisms influencing behavior in marine protected areas in the 15 cases with robust
data. The following section summarizes our findings with respect
to these three mechanisms.
(i) Perceptions of legitimacy and likelihood of benefits
Perceptions of legitimacy centered around three types of legitimacy: Legal legitimacy, social acceptability, and ecological credibility. Perceptions of legal legitimacy took into consideration
whether the regime was formally recognized and whether it was
based in informal law or tradition. Formal recognition was most
critical in situations where outsiders came to fish in an area (e.g.,
Fumba, Isla Costa Rica, Puerto Peñasco). However, formal recognition alone was insufficient to confer legitimacy on fisheries’ protection strategies, as evidenced by the Itacolomis Reef fishers’
resistance to no-take zones and Karimunjawa fishers’ decisions
to ignore spatial restrictions in the national marine park. Both
cases illustrate the importance of social acceptability and ecological credibility as aspects of legitimacy.
The social acceptability aspect of legitimacy hinges on the fact
that recognition of an institution’s legal authority to make decisions does not necessarily translate into agreement with or adherence to the decisions that are made under that authority (Tyler,
2006). The two state cases (Sumilon Island and RSB Corals) and
three of the co-management cases (Fumba, Itacolomis Reef, and
Karimunjawa) most clearly illustrated how the absence of social
acceptability can undermine legal legitimacy. The CMO analyses
also revealed that expectations of benefits and social acceptability
are closely linked, with social acceptability being unlikely to exist
in the absence of a widespread perception that benefits will be
forthcoming. Importantly, however, perceived benefits were not
restricted to economic benefits but also included social and psychological benefits. For example, Walmsley and White (2003)
found that communities with MPAs supported them even when
the ecological improvements were small. They attributed this support to community members’ enhanced sense of pride and ownership. Beitl (2011) also identified the development of a sense of
pride and ownership as an important benefit of the custodia in Isla

223

Costa Rica, as did Crawford et al. (2010) for the Aserradores case in
Nicaragua. Whether resource users perceived the restrictions to be
fairly applied also influenced whether the restrictions were considered socially acceptable. The importance of fairness was most evident in the RSB Corals case in which fishers saw no reason to
comply with the rules given that they felt that the state was not
applying the prohibition on industrial fishing within the park. This
finding dovetails with McCay et al.’s (2014, p. 54) study of state
fishery concessions where the researchers found that perceptions
of fairness increased compliance among Mexican fishing cooperatives. Studies of legitimacy in other contexts have shown that fairness in the application of rules is a fundamental factor in whether
rules are perceived as legitimate or not (Tyler, 2006).
Ecological credibility was a third aspect of legitimacy that
became visible through the CMO analysis. We interpreted a decision as ecologically credible when resource users’ knowledge of
the fishery’s ecosystem processes led them to believe that the decision would result in the outcomes predicted by proponents of the
decision. Perceptions of the likelihood of benefits were intimately
linked to perceptions of ecological credibility; a finding that dovetails with Lawry’s (1990) study of the efficacy of newly imposed
communal grazing rules in Lesotho. This makes sense since it is
unlikely that benefits will materialize if the interventions being
implemented are premised on an incorrect understanding of ecological conditions and processes (Lawry, 1990).
Figure 6 shows how the three aspects of legitimacy combine to
create perceptions of what DeWit and Iles (2016) call ‘‘thick” legitimacy and for which we use the term ‘‘robust” legitimacy. DeWit
and Iles’ use of the term ‘‘thick” legitimacy borrows from Geertz’
(1973) concept of ‘‘thick description” (which itself was borrowed
from Ryle’s (1949) use of the term ‘‘thick” description), in which
the task of the ethnographer is to convey the multiple layers of
facts, meanings, and interpretations that woven together make
up cultures. Similarly, DeWit and Iles (2016) research shows how
legitimacy takes the form of a bundle of processes including ‘‘scientific validation, recognition in policy-making and government,
practical testing against experiences, and verification by civil society actors.” They argue that a more robust legitimacy emerges
from the combination of these processes, through creating an
authority that is strong and broadly recognized because it is ‘‘woven into the knowledge-making of scientific and political institutions, and embedded in widely practiced social conventions.” A
working hypothesis for our study is that in cases where legal legitimacy, social acceptability, and ecological credibility are present,
ecological outcomes are likely to be better than in cases where
one or more of the three aspects is weak or absent.
(ii) Perceptions of capacity to enforce
Perceptions of the capacity to enforce were closely bound up
with perceptions of legitimacy. The Puerto Peñasco case, in which
outsiders ignored the fishing cooperative’s harvesting restrictions
once the state ceased to provide informal support, provided the
clearest example of how these two mechanisms are linked. Importantly, however, an organized surveillance system was not necessarily required for fishers to perceive that a governance regime
had the capacity to enforce restrictions. Peer pressure and internalized cultural norms provided adequate incentives for fishers to
abide by rules in some cases. Voluntary compliance appeared to
work better in the cases where the resource users perceived the
regime to have legal legitimacy and where the restrictions were
perceived as socially acceptable and ecologically credible. Communities that relied on voluntary compliance (as well as some of those
which did not) increased the likelihood of compliance by siting
marine protected areas in places with where poachers were likely
to be seen. These findings have important policy and programing
implications because a system that can function effectively
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Figure 6. The multiple facets of legitimacy in natural resource governance systems.

through voluntary compliance is less costly to maintain (Tyler,
2006) and, provided that cultural norms and values supporting
that system are regularly reinforced, is more likely to endure. It
is worth noting that our cases showed that voluntary compliance
can occur in other contexts other than customary tenure regimes.
In the Maria Islands (St Lucia) case, one of the 34 cases not
included in the in-depth CMO analysis, voluntary compliance
was sufficient for enforcing a sea urchin harvesting moratorium
in a state-managed nature reserve despite the absence of state
enforcement. Smith and Berkes (1991) attributed the informal
enforcement system’s success to strong and widespread support
for the reserve, agreement with the sea urchin harvesting moratorium, and local residents’ desire to ensure that the rules were
applied equally to all.
The Roviana case also demonstrates that the effectiveness of
voluntary compliance is context-dependent. Initially the Roviana
reserve system relied on shellfish collectors to self-enforce, but
three factors undermined this strategy. First, many collectors were
skeptical that the no-take zones would increase shellfish productivity enough to offset loss in access to harvesting sites, and, as a
result, some collectors continued to harvest in the no-take zones.
Second, some of the shellfish beds were in mangrove forests where
poachers were hard to detect and the shellfish, which had a high
market value, could easily be concealed during transport. As a
result, some women were willing to risk harvesting illegally. Third,
some community members who felt they had not been compensated for their rights to the no-take zones chose to ignore harvesting restrictions. The Roviana case suggests that willingness to
comply voluntarily with restrictions may be linked not only to
how people perceive that benefits will be distributed, but also to
how they believe they should be distributed. Ultimately, reliance
on voluntary compliance proved insufficient in Roviana and the
communities involved took steps to establish a more formalized
system.
(c) Revisiting our theory of change framework—Conceptualizing
mechanisms as bundles
At the outset of this review, we conceptualized mechanisms as
operating in tandem but more or less independently of each other.
As we analyzed the cases, it became apparent that it is more useful
to think of mechanisms as comprised of a bundle of interacting
components. The fisheries’ cases suggest the presence of a
legitimacy-benefits-capacity mechanism bundle that links socioecological contexts and environmental outcomes. The case examples show that the three mechanisms in the bundle can both reinforce and undermine each other. The practical implication is that
policy interventions focused only on changing the conditions

under which one mechanism is triggered are likely to have unanticipated consequences. More reliable results are probable if interventions take into account how the three mechanisms interact
with each other. It is also worth noting that in three of the cases,
Roviana, Puerto Peñasco, and Sumilon, perceptions of the legitimacy of the MPAs was strongly linked to the presence of single
influential actors. This highlights the importance of recognizing
the role that leadership plays in the success or failure of collective
action related to natural resources (Lobo, Vélez, & Puerto, 2016).
(d) Comparisons with other reviews
Nilsson et al.’s (2016) review of community-based conservation
behaviors and our review of the environmental outcomes of different property regimes are pioneering applications of the realist synthesis method to the study of how and under what circumstances
natural resource conservation and governance interventions work
(or don’t work). Nilsson et al. (2016) explored three mechanisms that
can potentially trigger conservation behaviors (perceptions of economic value associated with conservation behaviors, perceptions
of cost/benefits of changing behavior, and degree to which communities exercise authority over resource management decisions) and
tentatively identified two additional mechanisms through their
CMO analyses (knowledge of conservation behavior and understanding the importance of conservation). Additionally, they found
preliminary evidence of the existence of other mechanisms, including confidence that conservation behaviors will result in the promised benefits, as well as feelings of respect, trust, and autonomy.
Our findings complement Nilsson et al.’s study by providing a
nuanced understanding of the mechanism they labeled ‘‘community authority”, which partially overlaps with our mechanism,
‘‘perceptions of legitimacy”. Moreover, we found that in our set
of cases, social acceptability and fairness of benefits distribution,
both of which Nilsson et al. identified as contextual factors influencing perceptions of the cost/benefit ratio of conservation behaviors, were important factors in determining whether fishing
restrictions were perceived as legitimate. Additionally, our study
revealed the bundled nature of mechanisms, and highlighted the
importance of understanding how mechanisms interact to undermine or support each other.
Our study complements quantitative systematic reviews
related to fisheries and protected areas. Our findings concur with
Sciberras, Jenkins, Kaiser, Hawkins, and Pullin (2013) evaluation
of the biological effectiveness of MPAs, in which they found that
few studies included data on fishing effort inside and outside the
reserves, and even fewer provided data on levels of enforcement
or compliance data. Through a close reading of cases, we illustrate
how such data can be used to develop hypotheses as to why and
when interventions dependent on compliance for success are likely
to succeed or fail. Our study complements Gutiérrez et al.’s (2011)
investigation of attributes associated with successful communitybased co-managed fisheries. They identified strong leadership,
social cohesion; catch share quotas, and protected areas as the
leading contributors to successful co-management. The combination of self-enforcement mechanisms linked with self-interests
was found to be especially important. Our analysis provides further
insights as to when self-enforcing mechanisms are likely to work
and when they are not. Our study also supports Cetas and
Yasué’s (2016) findings that successful projects tended to rely
more on intrinsic motivations to engage in conservation behavior
whereas less successful projects tended to rely on extrinsic motivations. This finding dovetails with our review, which highlights the
critical role that perceptions of legitimacy play in promoting voluntary adherence to fishing restrictions. However, our study also
suggests that a combination of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations
are likely needed to support widespread voluntary compliance
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with fishing restrictions, adoption of different fishing practices, or
adoption of alternative livelihood strategies.
(e) Limitations of the study
Several factors limit the generalizability of our findings. Many of
the articles included in the review had limited data related to our
theory of change framework’s components and most lacked data
about important social, economic, and governance factors, as well
as intermediate outcomes and mechanisms. Given the diversity in
property regime types and geographical areas represented by those
cases that did have sufficient data for in-depth CMO analysis, our
findings are best viewed as a basis for formulating hypotheses
about how property regime interventions might work in different
circumstances, rather than as definitive statements about how an
intervention will play out in a given context. However, we emphasize that datasets characterized by insufficient and inconsistent
reporting on key variables are not a problem unique to realist syntheses but are common to other types of systematic reviews of
complex socio-ecological systems as well (Brooks et al., 2013;
Sciberras et al., 2013). The trend in science away from producing
monographs toward splitting scientific findings into ‘‘minimum
publishable units” (Lee, 1997) has contributed to a situation in
which data relevant to a study is scattered across many small
papers rather than being published in one comprehensive monograph, thereby complicating the task of conducting systematic
reviews. The problem this presents is evident in our Phase I CMO
analysis, which found that fewer than 50% of the cases included
data on fishing effort, and only a fifth provided data on compliance
levels, both factors that would almost certainly affect environmental outcomes of MPAs. Another limitation of our synthesis is that
our review’s scope was limited primarily to tropical marine fisheries, with over-representation from a small number of countries
and under-representation for most others. Notable gaps in geographic coverage were countries in Africa other than Tanzania
and South Africa, and mainland countries in Asia. Realist syntheses
applied to other types of fisheries, other countries, or other types of
resource systems, such as forests or rangelands, might reveal somewhat different CMO configurations. As noted in our introductory
discussion, interventions implemented across different contexts
may result in different outcome patterns because mechanisms are
functions of the interactions that take place between participants
and their context (Wong et al., 2013). Therefore, it would be imprudent to assume that CMO configurations associated with marine
protected areas will necessarily manifest themselves in other
resource contexts, and a comparative analysis across resource systems could prove useful (Ojanen et al., 2017).
(f) Policy and research implications
The analysis of the 49 fisheries’ cases highlights the importance
for researchers and policy makers to recognize the variability within
property regime categories if their goals include providing practitioners with useable data or effective policies and programs. This
is particularly true for hybrid and customary regimes, which often
are lumped into broad categories, despite often-significant differences among sub-categories in how rights and responsibilities are
distributed. As well, contexts are diverse, and efforts by researchers
and policy-makers to generalize across broad regions and diverse
resource systems are likely to prove counter-productive.
The in-depth CMO analysis points to the need for policy interventions that take into account the multiple dimensions of legitimacy,
how perceptions of the likelihood of receiving benefits support or
undermine legitimacy, and how perceptions of legitimacy support
or undermine perceptions of enforcement capacity. Increased
attention to understanding the mechanisms that encourage or dis-
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courage voluntary compliance in different socio-ecological contexts
and the types of policies that can bolster those mechanisms is a
promising avenue for laying a foundation for conservation policies
and practices that are sustainable over the long term.
Inconsistencies and gaps in the coverage of key variables in
publications on natural resource governance is a challenge that
realist synthesis practitioners, but also practitioners of other types
of systematic reviews, are likely to continue to face. Previous studies have called for authors to include more details, either in the
body of their articles or in the form of Supplementary materials,
when writing up their research results (Brooks et al., 2013; Yin
et al., 2016). Although we concur that the inclusion of additional
details in published studies would be useful, we question whether
the current culture of academic publishing, which rewards authors
who produce more articles and discourages the publication of
lengthy articles, provides the necessary incentive structure, even
given the expanding opportunities for including Supplemental
materials. Instead, we suggest that systematic reviewers consider
adopting a middle-ground alternative that would modify the
review process so that it better fits the data likely to be available
for studies of complex socio-ecological systems. During our review,
it became apparent that many of the articles we included were just
one of a sometimes extensive set of studies about the protected
area. This was especially true for cases involving long-term interdisciplinary research projects focused on a specific geographical
location. It is likely that our analyses would have been much more
robust if we had centered our analyses on the case as reflected in
the set of publications available on the protected area under study,
rather than on the case as reflected in a single article. We therefore
recommend multi-sourcing of case data as a strategy for developing robust realist syntheses.
(g) Suggestions for further reading
For readers interested in learning more about using a realist
synthesis approach to evidence review, Pawson and Tilley’s
(1997) ‘‘Realistic evaluation” is an important starting point. It lays
out the principles of scientific realism and describes how the
context-mechanism-outcomes framework derived from those
principles is a powerful tool for program evaluation when complex
systems are involved. Rycroft-Malone et al.’s (2012), ‘‘Realist synthesis: illustrating the method for implementation research”, provides a succinct and accessible step-by-step description of the
realist synthesis process as applied to public health programs,
starting from the development of a theoretical framework, continuing with data extraction and validation, and ending with a synthesis of the evidence. Dalkin et al.’s (2015) article, ‘‘What’s in a
mechanism? Development of a key concept in realist evaluation”,
helps clarify the concept of mechanism as it is used in realist synthesis, and emphasizes the critical importance for evaluators to
identify the changes in reasoning brought about by interventions.
Nilsson et al.’s (2016), ‘‘How do community-based conservation
programs in developing countries change human behaviour? A
realist synthesis”, illustrates how realist synthesis can be fruitfully
applied to the evaluation of the contextual factors affecting conservation behaviors, and highlights the need for conservation research
to pay greater attention to the reasoning of individuals affected by
conservation policies.
For readers interested in exploring further how perceptions of
legitimacy influence individual and group behavior, Tyler’s
(2006) article ‘‘Psychological perspectives on legitimacy and legitimation”, provides an overview of social thought on the concept of
legitimacy, with an emphasis on the role that perceptions of legitimacy play in encouraging voluntary compliance with regulations.
De Wit and Iles’ (2016) study, ‘‘Toward thick legitimacy: Creating a
web of legitimacy for agroecology”, offers an insightful exploration
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of the ways in which multiple social and political processes interact to legitimize (or delegitimize) scientific knowledge. Among the
studies included in this review, Cudney-Bueno and Basurto’s
(2009) article, ‘‘Lack of cross-scale linkages reduces robustness of
community-based fisheries management”, and Campbell et al.’s
(2012) study, ‘‘Weak compliance undermines the success of notake zones in a large government-controlled marine protected
area”, provide the most explicit assessments of the links between
perceptions of legitimacy and conservation behavior.
6. Conclusion
We report on a pilot application of a realist synthesis approach
to the systematic review of evidence regarding factors that influence environmental outcomes of fisheries’ management under different types of property regimes. The realist synthesis approach
enabled us to better understand how the three mechanisms examined through a C-M-O analysis (perceptions of legitimacy, likelihood of benefits, and enforcement capacity) operated in different
socio-ecological contexts to support (or undermine) behavioral
changes that affected environmental conditions. Based on that
analysis, the multi-faceted nature of the concept of legitimacy
was revealed, with robust legitimacy shown to result when all
three facets—legal legitimacy, social acceptability, and ecological
credibility—are strong and broadly manifested. When one or more
of the facets is weak, behaviors that undermine conservation
objectives are likely to be triggered. Finally, the more granular
understanding of the diverse mix of property rights arrangements
in hybrid systems generates insights into greater practical value to
policy makers and resource managers in shaping programs better
adapted to real-world contexts. Hybrid systems are adaptive to
the richness and diversity of human experience. Where their historical and social antecedents and strengths and weaknesses are
better understood, more humane and democratic solutions to
resource governance problems are likely to emerge.
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